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Abstract
Curie’s Principle says that any symmetry property of a cause must be found in its
effect. In this article, I consider Curie’s Principle from the point of view of graphical causal
models, and demonstrate that, under one definition of a symmetry transformation, the
causal modeling framework does not require anything like Curie’s Principle to be true. On
another definition of a symmetry transformation, the graphical causal modeling formalism
does imply a version of Curie’s Principle. These results yield a better understanding of the
logical landscape with respect to the relationship between Curie’s Principle and graphical
causal modeling.
1 Introduction
There is currently a lively debate in philosophy of physics over whether or not Curie’s Principle
says anything meaningful about the role that symmetries play in the causal structure of the
world. While competing precisifications of the principle abound, the core idea can be traced back
to Pierre Curie’s results regarding the piezoelectric properties of crystals (Curie 1894). On the
basis of these results, Curie conjectured that nature does not contain spontaneous asymmetries;
any symmetry property of a cause must also be a symmetry property of its effect, where the term
‘symmetry’ has a technical meaning that I will soon spell out in more detail. This prohibition
on spontaneous asymmetry has come to be known as Curie’s Principle. Ismael (1997), Brading
and Castellani (2003), and Castellani and Ismael (2016) have argued that Curie’s Principle is
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a true generalization in physics, while Belot (2003), Earman (2004), Roberts (2013, 2016), and
Norton (2016) have all claimed that the principle, precisely stated, is either false or a tautology
that is at least sometimes vacuous.1
The debate over the status of Curie’s Principle has centered around various cases in clas-
sical and quantum mechanics, and whether or not they validate the principle. On both sides
of this debate, causal relations are mostly cashed out by appealing to an intuitive or “folk”
understanding of cause and effect.2 This recourse to intuition creates substantial room for ma-
neuvering for the defender of Curie’s Principle. In the face of counterexamples to the principle,
it is always possible to claim that the putative counterexample does not correctly represent the
causal metaphysics of a given scenario, and to reinterpret the example so that the principle
is non-vacuously true. What is missing from this debate is an independent understanding of
what counts as a causal relation, such that we can determine whether or not this understanding
implies the truth of Curie’s Principle.
In light of this observation, it is surprising that the discussion of Curie’s Principle in phi-
losophy of physics has been conducted without any consideration of the much larger body of
literature on graphical causal modeling, an approach pioneered by Pearl (2000), Halpern (2000),
and Spirtes et al. (2000). In this tradition, causal relationships are represented using the re-
sources of graph theory. Causal relata are represented as random variables at the vertices of a
graph, with one vertex being interpreted as the direct cause of another just in case there is a
directed edge relating the causal variable to the effect variable. In the deterministic context,
the graphical approach to causal modeling is usually articulated using the theory of structural
equation models, or ‘SEMs’, and directed acyclic graphs, or ‘DAGs’. To be clear, SEMs and
DAGs are two formal approaches that complement each other in formalizing the causal struc-
ture of a target system; they are not competing. For the purpose of this paper, the crucial
feature of a graphical causal model is that it satisfies the Markov condition, which states that
variables in a causal model are screened off from their non-effects by their causes. Where the
Curie’s Principle literature is vague about what constitutes a causal relation in a model of a
physical system, the graphical causal modeling framework is precise; one random variable is a
direct cause of the other if there is a directed edge from the first to the second in a graphical
model of the system that satisfies the Markov condition. The meanings of the technical terms
1For an older philosophical discussion of Curie’s Principle, see Chalmers (1970).
2For instance, Roberts (2013) treats the initial state of a harmonic oscillator as a cause of subsequent states
of the oscillator, without any substantive argument for this treatment.
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used in the previous sentence will be made more precise in what follows.
This lack of a connection between the literature on Curie’s Principle and the literature
on causal modeling is surprising in light of the significant role that the graphical formalism
for causal modeling plays in contemporary discussions of causation throughout philosophy of
science, including philosophy of physics. Woodward’s (2003) widely-cited account of causation
and causal explanation in the sciences is derived in large part from the graphical causal modeling
formalism developed in Pearl (2000), Halpern (2000), and Spirtes et al. (2000). In the specific
context of physics, Frisch (2014) puts forward a book-length treatment of causation in physics
that aims in large part to show that physical theories obey the axioms of graphical causal
modeling. Further, in recent work, Ismael (2018) has herself defended an account of the physical
reality of causation that she explicitly states is consonant with Pearl’s account of graphical
causal modeling. Finally, recent work in physics by Costa and Shrapnel (2016) attempts to
use an extension of the graphical causal modeling framework to formalize causal relations in
quantum mechanics. To be clear, I do not wish to claim that connections between Curie’s
Principle and causal modeling are the only interesting connections that one can draw between
Curie’s Principle and other accounts of causation. Indeed, an interesting avenue for additional
work would be to consider what connections exist between Curie’s Principle and Dowe’s (2000)
account of causation in physics. However, for the purposes of this paper I confine myself to
exploring the connection between Curie’s Principle and graphical causal modeling.
My aim in this paper is to make progress on the debate over the status of Curie’s Principle
by formulating the principle in the language of causal modeling, in order to determine what
logical connections exist between Curie’s Principle on the one hand and the adequacy conditions
for causal graphs on the other. If one can show that any adequate causal graph must be such
that symmetries are preserved across causal relations, then this would show that defenders
of Curie’s principle and those who take causal modeling to provide a compelling account of
causation in the sciences, including physics, share a common argumentative ground. If, on
the other hand, there is no such connection, then the defender of Curie’s Principle should be
read as offering an account of causation that is logically independent from at least one of the
other prominent accounts of causation on offer. In what follows, I will show that whether or
not there is a logical connection between Curie’s Principle and the axioms of graphical causal
modeling depends on how we represent symmetry transformations formally. If we represent
a symmetry of a random variable as the composition of some transformation function and
3
the random variable in question that preserves the value of the random variable (call this the
“composition definition” of a symmetry), then we can give examples of causal models that satisfy
the Markov condition and yet are such that Curie’s Principle is false. On the other hand, if we
represent a symmetry transformation on a random variable as a transformation on the domain
of a random variable that preserves the value of that random variable (call this the “domain
transformation definition” of a symmetry), then an analogue of Curie’s Principle is implied by
the causal modeling formalism. In this way, my results here help to provide a clearer map of
the argumentative territory when it comes to the formalization of causal relations and Curie’s
Principle: if either the defenders or the detractors of Curie’s Principle are correct in their thesis
about the symmetry-preserving nature of causal relations, then they will have to either defend
a particular formalization of the concept of a symmetry transformation, or else say something
about where the causal modeling framework goes wrong.
The plan for this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I provide background details on Curie’s
Principle and the recent debate over its status as a physical principle. In Section 3, I review
the graphical modeling approach to the representation of causal structure, and propose a for-
mulation of Curie’s Principle using the formalism of causal modeling. In Section 4, I give
a counterexample showing that, under the composition definition of a symmetry, a graphical
causal model need not be such that the causal relations represented by the graph must satisfy
Curie’s Principle. I then prove a result showing that, under the domain transformation defini-
tion of a symmetry, a graphical causal model must obey Curie’s Principle. In Section 5, I offer
concluding remarks.
2 Curie’s Principle
Pierre Curie’s interest in the role that symmetries might play in the relationship between cause
and effect began with his study of the piezoelectricity of crystals in 1894 (Castellani 2003, 323).
Very briefly, Curie discovered that by compressing a crystal so as to eliminate the existence of
certain geometric symmetries in its molecular structure, one could also induce asymmetries in
the crystal’s electric field, creating a displacement current. From this observation, Curie made
the conjecture that symmetry-preservation is a necessary feature of causal relations in general.
That is, he held that “effects are phenomena which always require a certain asymmetry [in their
causes] in order to arise. If this asymmetry does not exist, the phenomena are impossible” (Curie
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1894; translated in Brading and Castellani 2003, 312). Since all effects must share asymmetries
with their causes, it follows from Curie’s claim that any symmetry of a cause must also be a
symmetry of its effect. Indeed, Curie writes that “when certain causes produce certain effects,
the symmetry elements of the causes must be found in their effects” (Curie 1894; translated in
Brading and Castellani 2003, 313).
Brading and Castellani take the physical significance of Curie’s Principle seriously, writing
that the conjecture “offers a falsification criterion for physical theories”, and that “a violation
of Curie’s Principle may indicate that something is wrong in the physical description” (2003,
10). They claim that Curie’s Principle can be motivated by appeal to the principle of sufficient
reason; arguing that “the breaking of [an] initial symmetry cannot happen without a reason, or
an asymmetry cannot originate spontaneously” (2003, 9-10, emphasis theirs). Similarly, Ismael
(1997) argues that if the laws of nature are deterministic, then the entailments of those laws
must preserve any symmetries of the laws themselves. These statements suggest that Curie’s
Principle is a powerful metaphysical constraint on acceptable representations of physical reality.
On a plausible reading, these authors seem to be suggesting that whatever form our final physics
takes, it must not allow for spontaneous asymmetries between a cause and its effects.
Norton (2016) formalizes Curie’s principle as follows. He begins by representing possible
causes and effects as the sets C = {C1, C2, ..., Cn} and E = {E1, E2, ..., Em}. He then stipulates
that the symmetry groups GC and GE are sets satisfying the following conditions:
1. If SC ∈ GC , then for any Cj , SC · Cj = Cj .
2. If SE ∈ GE , then for any Ei, SE · Ei = Ei (Norton 2016, 1016).
This formalization allows him to state Curie’s Principle as follows (1017):
Curie’s Principle: If causes C admit symmetries GC and are mapped to effects E
via the function Ei = f(Cj), then there is a symmetry group GE that is isomorphic
to GC .3
3Norton actually defines Curies Principle as a tautology of the following form: If (1) causes C admit symmetries
GC and are mapped to effects E via the function Ei = f(Cj), and (2) if causes C admit symmetries GC and are
mapped to effects E via the function Ei = f(Cj), then there is a symmetry group GE that is isomorphic to GC ,
then there is a symmetry group GE that is isomorphic to GC . Norton represents Curie’s Principle as a tautology
for dialectical reasons: since proponents of Curie’s Principle as a falsification criterion for physics generally argue
that the principle is tautological, opponents such as Norton want to grant them this claim, but then show that
the tautology is vacuous. In practice, however, such debate always concerns the truth value of claim (2) in the
antecedent of the tautological formulation of Curie’s Principle. It is easier, therefore, to take ‘Curie’s Principle’
to refer to claim (2) in the tautological formulation.
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Several aspects of Norton’s formalization are left under-specified. This is deliberate, as Norton
intends to give a “sparse” characterization of the principle. Nevertheless, it is worth being
explicit about which components of the principle are under-specified. First, it is not specified
what, formally speaking, the elements of C and E are; in Norton’s examples, they are inter-
changeably functions or numbers. Second, the nature of the operations SC ·Cj and SE ·Ei is not
specified. If, for example, causes and effects are real numbers, then it is natural to read SC ·Cj
as the value of a function ϕ(Cj), where ϕ : R → R. On the other hand, if Cj is a function,
then one might read SC ·Cj as the composition SC ◦Cj . As I will demonstrate in what follows,
considering Curie’s Principle in the context of graphical causal models allows for decidedly less
ambiguity in the formulation of the principle and the assessment of its status.
Roberts (2013) argues that Curie’s Principle is falsified by a simple case in classical mechan-
ics. Consider a harmonic oscillator in the form of a bob on a spring. At t = 0, the spring is
compressed so that the bob is at a certain position. Let the state of the bob be a pair (q, p)
representing its position and momentum along a single spatial dimension. The momentum term
p is a one-dimensional momentum vector, such that its sign changes depending on the direction
of the momentum. The bob has zero velocity at t = 0, and therefore has zero momentum. When
an object has zero momentum, its momentum is time-reversal invariant; regardless of whether
time is running backwards or forwards, the momentum remains zero. However, the position of
the bob at t = 0, i.e. how far down we compress the spring, causes the spring to have a certain
non-zero momentum once the stress on the spring is released. This non-zero momentum changes
through time, and is therefore not time-reversal invariant. Thus, even though the initial state of
the spring is a cause of the subsequent states of the spring, the initial state of the spring is sym-
metric with respect to time reversals, while subsequent states of the spring are not symmetric
with respect to time reversals. Thus, the system violates Curie’s Principle. In Roberts (2016),
other cases in physics are described in which causes are invariant under symmetries like rotation
but their effects are not, thereby putatively falsifying or rendering vacuous Curie’s principle.
More precisely, let (q(0), p(0)) be the state of the bob on the spring at t = 0, and let this
state be the sole element of the set of causes C. Let it also be the case that for all times
t ∈ (0,∞), (q(t), p(t)) = (cos(2t),− sin(2t)). Thus, at t = 0, the state of the bob is (1, 0), and
at some fixed future time t the state of the bob is (cos(2t),− sin(2t)). Let this future state of
the bob be the sole member of the set of effects E . Let SC : (q, p) 7→ (q,−p) be a transformation
on states of the bob, representing the change in the direction of the momentum of the bob
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under time reversal. As (1, 0) = (1,−0), SC is clearly a symmetry of the initial state of the
spring. Further, for a fixed t we can define a function such that (1, 0) 7→ (q(t), p(t)). Thus,
the two antecedent conditions for Curie’s Principle are satisfied. However, for any t ∈ (0, 2π),
(q(t), p(t)) 6= (q(t),−p(t)). Thus, the symmetry group GC is not isomorphic to the symmetry
group GE , and so Curie’s Principle is putatively violated (Roberts 2013, 580-3).
In response to the example described above, Castellani and Ismael (2016) argue that the
final state of the bob on the spring is symmetric across time-reversal, under a non-standard
definition of time reversal due to Albert (2000) and Callender (2000). They argue that we have
to consider “the intrinsic, instantaneous state of the spring”, which is specified by the spring’s
position and not its momentum. Their idea is that we should treat any state of the bob on the
spring after t = 0 as being frozen in time, such that we can only consider the symmetries of
its position, and not its momentum. Since time-reversal is a symmetry of any instantaneous
state of the oscillator in this non-standard sense, Ismael and Castellani conclude that Curie’s
Principle is still true and Curie’s Principle is not vacuous.4
The exchange between Roberts on the one hand and Ismael and Castellani on the other is
characteristic of the recent debate over the status of Curie’s Principle. Roberts starts with an
intuitive understanding of cause and effect wherein the state of the spring when it is compressed
is treated as a cause, and the state of the spring after it is released is treated as an effect, where
the state of the spring includes its momentum. On this understanding of cause and effect, Curie’s
Principle is rendered false. Ismael and Castellani respond that if we take the instantaneous
position of the spring to be a cause, then the effect of that cause must be some subsequent
instantaneous description of the spring, thereby salvaging the truth of Curie’s Principle. Thus,
the debate over whether or not Curie’s Principle is violated by any dynamical system boils
down to whether or not we are required to represent causes and effects in a way that ensures
symmetry preservation.
As mentioned in the introduction, what is striking about this debate is the way in which a
commonsense or folk understanding of causation is taken for granted when discussing putative
counterexamples to Curie’s Principle. Roberts, Ismael and Castellani all assume that we can
treat the initial state of the spring as the cause of some subsequent state of the spring, and
then debate over whether Curie’s Principle provides a constraint on how we can represent this
subsequent state of the spring, in light of this causal relationship; at no point do they appeal to
4Roberts (2017) argues against this interpretation of time reversal.
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any independent understanding of causation. The closest thing to a general account of causation
is provided by Roberts, who says that “an ‘effect’ is a state and a ‘cause’ is another state related
to the first by a deterministic law”; this minimal definition would indeed render the verdict that
the initial state of the spring is a cause, and a subsequent state of the spring is its effect (2013,
579). Nowhere in Ismael and Castellani’s response to Roberts (2016, 1011-2) do they take issue
with Roberts’ characterization of the causal relata in this scenario, focusing instead on the issues
with time reversal discussed above. As such, this debate appears to be a clash of competing
intuitions over how to correctly describe the states of some dynamical system.
In what follows, I pursue a novel method of adjudicating between the two views. As discussed
in the introduction, I will consider causation from the point of view of graphical causal models,
to see if there is any logical connection between this notion of causation and Curie’s Principle.
As I will make clear in what follows, the graphical causal modeling formalism lends precision to
this debate by specifying that causal relata must be random variables that stand in a specific
relation to one another within the formal model; namely, an effect variable must be a function
defined on the range of possible values that can be taken by each of its causes, which are
themselves random variables. I will then show that whether or not Curie’s Principle holds in
this context depends upon one’s formalization of the concept of a symmetry transformation.
3 Curie’s Principle and Causal Graphs
A causal model is a tripleM = (V, E ,F) where where V is a set of random variables, E is a set
of ordered pairs of those variables, or edges, and F is a set of structural equations. Note that
any random variable Vi is a function from some underlying space of possibilities Ω into some
range RVi . We assume that all random variables in a causal model share a common domain of
possibilities Ω, and are all measurable with respect to some probability space (Ω,Σ, P ), where
Σ is an algebra on Ω (i.e. a set of subsets of Ω that is closed under union, intersection, and
complement). We also introduce some graphical terminology. If there is a pair (X,Y ) ∈ E , then
X is a parent of Y . If there is a chain of edges from X to Y , then X is an ancestor of Y and Y
is a descendant of X. We stipulate that E defines a directed acyclic graph, or DAG, meaning
that no variable X ∈ V is a descendant of itself; i.e. there are no cycles in the graph. So, in
a simple causal graph E = X → Y → Z, X is a parent and ancestor of Y , Y is a parent and
ancestor of Z, X is an ancestor but not a parent of Z, Z and Y are descendants of X, and Z
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is a descendant of Y .
The set of structural equations F is a set of equations of the form vi = fi(pai, εi), where vi
is the value of a variable Vi ∈ V, pai is the vector of values taken by Vi’s parents in E , and εi is
an error term reflecting an exogenous source of indeterminacy in the value of the variable Vi. In
other words, each equation represents how the value of each variable in the model is given by a
function of the values taken by some subset of the other variables in the model, plus exogenous
error. F contains one and only one such equation for each variable in V. Let two variables Vi
and Vj be independent, conditional on Vi’s parents PAi, if for all values vi and vj , and all sets
of values pai:
P (Vi = vi, Vj = vj |PAi = pai) = P (Vi = vi|PAi = pai)P (Vj = vj |PAi = pai) (1)
Pearl (2000, 30) proves that if the error terms for each variable are not correlated, then the
graph (V, E) will satisfy the following condition:
Markov Condition: Any variable in V is independent of its non-descendants in E
conditional on its parents in E .
Within the causal modeling literature, this condition is taken to provide the primary justification
for the causal interpretation of the edges in E . In more detail, let us interpret the parenthood
relation between two variables as a relation of direct causation, such that if Vi is a parent of
Vj , then Vi is a direct cause of Vj . Under this interpretation, Pearl’s result shows that if the
value of a variable is solely a function of its direct causes, and if all direct causes of two or more
variables are included in the model, then the Markov condition holds. There is some intuitive
appeal to the idea that an effect is a function of all and only its direct causes, and indeed,
Spirtes et al. (2000) take the acceptance of such a condition to be a primitive commitment of
causal modeling, along with the accompanying commitment that causation is the ancestral of
direct causation, so that if Vi is an ancestor of Vj , then Vi is a cause of Vj . Note that the same
functional definition of causation is accepted by proponents of Curie’s Principle; Ismael (1997)
holds that causes and effects are “mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive event types” related
to one another by functions (169).
I confine myself in this paper to discussion of Curie’s Principle under determinism, in large
part because Ismael takes the principle to only be necessarily true in deterministic contexts
(1997, 168). Thankfully, the special case in which variables are completely deterministic func-
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tions of their parents, with no exogenous error, is entirely consistent with the causal modeling
framework. Let an endogenous variable in a model M be a variable with at least one parent,
according to E . Suppose that for each endogenous variable Vi, the function fi(pai, εi) that
determines its value is such that the error term is redundant; for all εi, fi(pai, εi) = fi(pai).
Under these conditions, the Markov condition is satisfied as long the error terms for all ex-
ogenous variables are not correlated. To see this, note that if the value of any endogenous
Vi is determined by an error-free function of Vi’s parents, then for any vi, Vj , vj , and pai,
P (Vi = vi, Vj = vj |PAi = pai) = P (Vj = vj |PAi = pai) if P (Vi = vi|PAi = pai) = 1 or
P (Vi = vi, Vj = vj |PAi = pai) = 0 if P (Vi = vi|PAi = pai) = 0.5 Thus, where error terms
of endogenous variables in a causal model are effectively non-existent, such that endogenous
variables are entirely determined by the parents, endogenous variables are independent of all
variables in the model, conditional on their parents, which in turn implies that the Markov
condition holds.
Using the formalism of causal models, we can now re-define Curie’s Principle graphically:
Graphical Curie’s Principle: For any variableX in a causal modelM = (V, E ,F),
if GPAX is the symmetry group for the parents of X in E and GX is the symmetry
group for X, then there is a symmetry group GX to which GPAX is isomorphic.
The definition clarifies one aspect of Curie’s Principle that is left under-specified in Norton’s
formulation of the principle, namely, the formal character of causes and effects. In the graphical
framework, both causes and effects are represented as random variables, related by an edge in
the graph. Since the range of a random variable partitions the domain of possibilities on which
that random variable is defined, any random variable corresponds to a particular set of types of
ways the world can be. Thus, the representation of causes and effects as random variables is in
keeping with Ismael’s definition of causes and effects as sets of mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive event types, albeit with the added precision of defining these sets of event types as
the range of a random variable.
For the sake of clarity, I note here that the graphical account of causation allows for the
existence of many adequate causal models of a given target system. The same target system
can be adequately modeled in multiple different ways, depending on one’s choice of variables;
see Spirtes (2007) and Eberhardt (2016) for rigorous demonstrations of this point. For this
5Arntzenius (1992, 236) proves that the Markov condition, which he calls the “restricted common cause
principle”, applies to such deterministic systems.
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reason, it is a category mistake to ask whether the adequate causal model of a given target
system must satisfy Curie’s Principle. Instead, I ask here whether any adequate causal model
of a given target system satisfies Curie’s Principle.
It remains to formalize the nature of a symmetry transformation on a random variable. As
mentioned in the introduction, there are two ways to formalize this notion, and our choice of
formalization has consequences for the status of the graphical version of Curie’s Principle. The
first such definition of a symmetry transformation is as follows:
Composition Definition: A function S : RX → RS is a symmetry of a random
variable X if and only if, for all ω in the domain of X, (S ◦X)(ω) = X(ω).
In other words, on the composition definition, S is a symmetry of a random variable X if and
only if the composition of S and X is identical to the function X. On this definition, the domain
of S must be the range of X. I take this definition of symmetry to be closest to the definition
originally used by Ismael (1997, 171). Alternatively, one can define a symmetry of a random
variable as follows:
Domain Transformation Definition: A function S : Ω → Ω is a symmetry of a
random variable X if and only if, for all ω in the domain of X, X(S(ω)) = X(ω).
In other words, S is a domain transformation symmetry of X if and only if applying the
transformation S to the domain of X never changes X’s value. In a different context, Jantzen
(2019) defines a symmetry of a random variable in this way. Both definitions of a symmetry can
represent physically meaningful symmetries, such that the graphical Curie’s Principle tracks the
relevant physical principle defended by proponents of Curie’s Principle. For instance, if we let a
random variable X : Ω→ RX be such that the elements of RX are various possible sets of points
in three-dimensional space comprising a sphere, then one can represent a rotation or reflection
of the sphere via the composition transformation definition of a symmetry. Alternatively, we
could represent a sphere using a random variable Y : Ω→ {0, 1}, where Ω is a set of coordinates
in three-dimensional space, Y (ω) = 1 if ω is an element of the sphere, and Y (ω) = 0 otherwise.
Here, we could rotate the sphere by transforming the underlying space Ω. In what follows, I
show that, under the composition definition of a symmetry of a random variable, the graphical
version of Curie’s Principle does not hold. However, under the domain transformation definition
of a symmetry, graphical causal models necessarily satisfy Curie’s Principle.
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4 Clarifying the Status of the Graphical Curie’s Principle
Let us use an example from electromagnetism to demonstrate that the Markov condition can
be satisfied by a causal model in which Curie’s Principle is violated.6 Let Ω be a sample space
of possible worlds, each of which maximally specifies the physical state of a given material.
Let Bρ : Ω → RBρ be a random variable whose values represent the possible residual flux
density fields of the material. That is, each bρi ∈ RBρ is a function b
ρ
i : R3 → R3, or b
ρ
i :
u 7→ bρi (u), where the domain represents possible spatial locations within the material and the
range represents the set of possible residual flux vectors at any point on the material. Let
M : Ω→ RM be a random variable whose values represent the possible magnetization fields of
the material. That is, each mk ∈ RM is a function mk : R3 → R3, or mk : u 7→ mk(u), where
the domain represents possible spatial locations within the material and the range represents
the set of possible magnetization vectors at any point on the material. Let JM : Ω → RJM
be a random variable whose values represent the possible magnetization current fields of the
material. That is, each jMl ∈ RM is a function jMl : R3 → R3, or jMl : u 7→ jMl (u), where the
domain represents possible spatial locations within the material and the range represents the
set of possible magnetization current vectors at any point on the material.
Together, {Bρ,M, JM} make up the variable set V of a causal model (V, E ,F). Let the
edges E be defined so that E = Bρ → M → JM ; thus, the residual flux density field of the
material causes its magnetization field, which in turn causes its magnetization current field.




bρi where µ0 is the permeability of free space. (2)
jMl = ∇×mk (3)
Thus, the values of M and JM are both determined by functions on the range of their sole
parent, in keeping with the graphical causal modeling formalism. It is worth noting that these
structural equations are functionals, since they are mappings from one set of functions into
another. While somewhat non-standard, there is no formal obstacle to deploying the graphical
causal modeling formalism in this way. Note further that ∇ × mk denotes the curl of the
vector field mk. The causal model defined here satisfies the Markov condition; since the value
6Both Chalmers (1970) and Roberts (2016) also use electrodynamic examples to demonstrate putative viola-
tions of Curie’s Principle.
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of each variable is wholly dependent on its sole parent, each variable is independent of its
non-descendants, and indeed all other variables in the model, conditional on its parents.
Under the composition definition of a symmetry of a random variable, this causal model
violates the graphical Curie’s Principle. To see this, note first that any mk : u 7→ mk(u) can be
represented as a set of pairs:
mk = {(u1,mk(u1)), . . . , (u∞,mk(u∞))} (4)
Let S : RM → RS be defined as follows:
S : {(u1,mk(u1)), . . . , (u∞,mk(u∞))} 7→ {(u1,mk(Λu1)), . . . , (u∞,mk(Λu∞))} (5)







That is, S transforms a function mk into a function that first reflects its input vector u about
the origin, and then returns the value of mk for that reflected vector. It is well known that any
magnetization field is a pseudovector field, meaning that it returns the same value for an input
vector and the reflection of that vector about the origin; for anymk and any u, mk(u) = mk(Λr).
Thus, for any mk,
S(mk) = {(u1,mk(Λu1)), . . . , (u∞,mk(Λu∞))} = {(u1,mk(u1)), . . . , (u∞,mk(u∞))} = mk
(7)
and so (S ◦ mk)(ω) = mk(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus, S is a symmetry of M , according to the
composition definition of a symmetry of a random variable.
However, S is not a symmetry of JM under the composition definition of a symmetry. To
see this, note that the curl of a pseudovector field is a polar vector field, and so each jMl ∈ RJM
is a polar vector field. Unlike pseudovector fields, polar vector fields do not return the same
value for an input vector u and the reflection of u about the origin. So for any jMl , there exists
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a u such that jMl (u) 6= jMl (Λv). It follows from this that there exists a jMl such that
S(jMl ) = {(u1, jMl (Λu1)), . . . , (u∞, jMl (Λu∞))} 6= {(u1, jMl (u1)), . . . , (u∞, jMl (u∞))} = jMl
(8)
and so S is not a symmetry of JM , despite M being the sole parent of JM . This lack of
isometry between the symmetry groups of M and JM amounts to a violation of the graphical
Curie’s Principle under the composition definition of a symmetry.7 One might object to this line
of reasoning by arguing that the graphical model used here does not accurately represent the
causal structure of its target system, on the grounds that one should not think of the residual
flux density field of a material as causing its magnetization field, or its magnetization field as
causing its magnetization current field. In response, I note that on Woodward’s (2003) analysis
of causation in terms of interventional counterfactuals, one can argue that the magnetization
field of the material does cause its magnetization current field; a hypothetical, “surgical” inter-
vention on the material leading to changes in its magnetization field, where those changes are
independent of any other possible causes of the magnetization field, will lead to changes in the
magnetization current field.
Alternatively, one might try to resist the conclusion that this amounts to a genuine coun-
terexample to the graphical Curie’s Principle by following Ismael in arguing that in real systems,
apparent violations of Curie’s Principle only indicate that there is a hidden variable that has
been left out of the causal representation of the system. To illustrate, Ismael gives the example
of frog zygotes that “start out as spherical cells suspended in an homogeneous seeming fluid
and develop into highly structured organisms; almost every stage in their development intro-
duces asymmetries not apparently present in the preceding stage” (1997, 181). For her, this
state of affairs constrains physical theorizing about the development of frog zygotes; any more
advanced theory of zygote development must represent the initial state of the frog in a way that
accounts for the asymmetries present in the later stages. In response, I argue that while this
may be a plausible constraint on the class of models that we should consider when searching for
a new theory of frog zygote development, this constraint serves an entirely epistemological and
heuristic purpose, in that it makes the problem of model search more tractable. However, to
7This counterexample to the graphical Curie’s Principle makes no mention of the variable Bρ, and indeed the
variable can be omitted without obviating any implications of the example. However, as two-variable, one-edge
causal models trivially satisfy the Markov condition, I have chosen to include a third variable so as to make this
feature of the causal model in question non-trivial.
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impose this constraint as a falsification criterion for physical theories is an exercise in a priori
science. If we have empirically well-motivated reasons for proposing a causal model of zygote
development that allows for such spontaneous symmetry breaking, Curie’s Principle is not a
compelling reason to see such a model as necessarily incomplete or defective, at least when
symmetries are defined using the composition definition.
On the other hand, if we adopt the domain transformation definition of a symmetry, then
the graphical Curie’s Principle is implied by the causal modeling formalism. More precisely, the
following proposition is true:
Proposition 1. If S is a symmetry (in the domain transformation sense) of each of the parents
PAX of a variable X in a causal model M, then S is a symmetry of X.
Proof. Let PAX = {V1, . . . , Vn}. Let ϕ : Ω → Rn be such that ϕ : ω 7→ [V1(ω), . . . , Vn(ω)] =
paX. If S is a symmetry of each variable in PAX , then for all ω, ϕ(ω) = ϕ(S(ω)). Recall that
X : Ω→ RX , and that for all xi, xi = fX(paX). This means that, for all ω, X(ω) = (fX ◦ϕ)(ω).
Thus, if, for all ω, ϕ(ω) = ϕ(S(ω)), then for all ω, X(ω) = X(S(ω)), and so S is a symmetry
of X, under the domain transformation definition.
If any symmetry of PAX is also a symmetry of X, then there is a symmetry group GX that
is isomorphic to the symmetry group GPAX , so that the causal model in question satisfies
the graphical formulation of Curie’s Principle under the domain transformation definition of a
symmetry.
In addition to demonstrating the soundness of a version of Curie’s Principle in causal graphs,
Proposition 1 also speaks to the epistemological significance of Curie’s Principle. As Jantzen
(2019) argues, simulations or actual experiments that perform transformations on a given sample
space play an important role in the validation of graphical causal models defined on that sample
space, where the validation of a causal model is a process of checking that the causal structure
stipulated in the model accurately represents the causal structure of the system. Proposition
1 lends further support to this view, as it implies that one can check whether a hypothesized
causal relation holds between two variables by checking for an isometry between the symmetry
groups of the two variables, provided that one uses the domain transformation definition of
a symmetry. As Jantzen does not comment on Curie’s Principle in his work on symmetry
transformations and graphical causal model validation, the result proved here establishes a
previously unacknowledged connection between these two areas of the literature.
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5 Conclusion
This paper seeks an answer to a well-defined question: does the graphical causal modeling frame-
work, which is widely deployed throughout philosophy of science and the sciences themselves
to represent the causal structure of systems, imply Curie’s Principle, which is controversially
argued by some to be a necessary condition on a causal representation of any system? I then
show that the answer to this question depends on the formal definition of a symmetry trans-
formation. If one takes the graphical causal modeling formalism to be well-motivated, then
Curie’s Principle is only true if one adopts the domain transformation definition of a symme-
try transformation. On the other hand, if one wishes to maintain the physical importance of
Curie’s Principle, then one must either adopt the domain transformation definition of a symme-
try transformation, or else reject the applicability of the graphical causal modeling formalism
in at least some scenarios.
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